

# DEAD BUT NOT FORGOTTEN

*Survey on people killed since 1989-2006 in Baramulla District, of  
Jammu Kashmir*

Conducted by  
JAMMU KASHMIR COALITION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

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## Acknowledgements

Studies and surveys undertaken as a collective work and based on voluntary participation of people, where only travel expenses can be met, are an exhilarating experience for the participants. But it is time consuming, and harmonizing pre-occupations of working for living with availability of time for voluntary work can be confounding.

There were also moments of tension and frustration because the work was taking too long to complete. But successful teamwork, once completed, is its own reward. The enthusiasm of team members and the process of learning inherent in such efforts is the reason why it is so.

This survey and our analysis are now in the public domain. We welcome criticism that will help us improve standard of our work and plug shortcomings that may be brought to our notice. Because struggle for freedom for us also means a commitment to rigorously de-mystify obfuscatory politics, based on a denial of the essential truth that the struggle of our people is just and democratic. A struggle that is getting besmirched by the politics of slander and surrender.

We acknowledge our gratitude to the people of Baramulla who so readily came forward to talk to us. And who wanted to share so much more, which, given the nature of the survey, we could not honour.

## Baramulla: District Profile

Baramulla is the largest district in the entire Kashmir valley, both with reference to its population and area. The district is spread over an area of 4588 square kilometers, and according to the 2004-5 State Digest, its population is 11,69,780. Baramulla District is bounded by Kupwara in the north, Budgam and Poonch in the south, parts of Srinagar and Ladakh in the east and has the line of control to the west. (After the completion of this survey in 2006, Baramulla district was split into two, with Bandipore carved out as a separate district)

The district is administratively divided into eight Tehsils namely Bandipore, Baramulla, Gulmarg, Gurez, Pattan, Sonawari, Sopore, Uri and sixteen Community Development Blocks. Kashmiri is the main language of the people in the District, Pahari and Gojari are also spoken in Uri and the areas near the foothills of Gulmarg and Bandipora, and Sheena (Dard) is the local language in Gurez and Tilail areas.

At 45.50 percent Baramulla lags behind the state average on literacy (55.52) but compares reasonably against the other districts of the valley. At 903 the sex ratio of the district compares favorably with the state average of 892.

The vast majority of the population of the district are agriculturists, and horticulture— especially apple growing—is also a major source of income especially in the tehsil of Sopore. At 26749 hectares it leads the districts in the total area under apple cultivation. Other fruits like apricot, peach, pear, and dry fruits also form significant portions of the net sown area of the district. At 2690 hectares it leads the districts in Kashmir in the total area under forests, second only to Doda in the Jammu division.

The district has for ages been the natural passage for travelers out of the valley. And the city of Baramulla for long held the position of a gateway to the valley, as it was located on the route to the Valley from Muzaffarabad, now in Pakistan Administered Kashmir, and Rawalpindi, now in Pakistan. The present day Uri Muzaffarabad road (earlier known as the Rawalpindi cart road) was the only all weather link that the valley enjoyed with the rest of the world. A huge traffic of trade, ideas and culture proceeded from this area till the events of 1947 when travel through this road was restricted and the present day Jammu Srinagar highway made as an alternative land route that would connect this restive region to the Indian union.

## Introduction

In 2002 Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS) decided to undertake a door-to-door survey of an entire district to find out who was killed, when, where, how, and if possible, why. What was the rationale behind wanting to record these deaths? After all, in any war there are casualties. And amongst those who get killed there are combatants as well as civilians. But by leaving that death toll unexamined, by remaining innocent of the context and circumstances in which these deaths take place, one can never hope to understand what the nature of the conflict is. It was to provide precisely this context that the Survey of Death Toll in District Baramulla was undertaken.

Who were the dead? What were their names? How old were they? Were they students or working people? Where did they come from? Who did they leave behind? What did they do? How much had they studied? How many men, women, children perished? Were there more men than women? More young than old? Which stratum of the society did they come from? What caused their death?

A questionnaire was prepared (Appendix 1) in which we asked respondents 37 questions, grouped under seven heads. Through this survey we hoped to, so to speak, bring 'alive' the profile of the dead, and by so doing, fill out the contemporary history of our people, and save those who died in a struggle for freedom from becoming mere statistics in the records of an occupation force.

Although Jammu and Kashmir came under military occupation in October 1947 the armed resistance began only after 1988. The decades in between 1947-88 saw a movement fight for the right of self-determination through non-violent militant struggle. Every step of the this way was punctuated with obstacles, in the form of direct physical assault, arbitrary arrests, false cases, long periods of detention without trial, as well as the politics of proscription where organizations were banned and their literature seized, and elections rigged...

But what followed in 1988 was something unprecedented in scale and magnitude, and it will be no exaggeration to say that J&K will hereafter not remain the same. Our report State of Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir 1990-2006 [Pub. JKCCS, Srinagar 2006] pointed out that based on our research, our projections showed that death toll for the period between 1990-2004 was more than 70,000, when for the same period the Indian State was reporting a death toll of 47,000 (1990-2005). And that authorities have under-played tens of thousands of deaths of people killed in J&K as a consequence of a war against a democratic movement.

While we proudly admit to being partisan, and hold the Indian State responsible for the loss of lives, we also do not believe in belittling anyone's suffering. All those thousands of people who have been killed, including renegades who committed innumerable war crimes, have died as a consequence of war, as victims of a long, cruel war. It is inconceivable that such internecine bloodletting would have taken place but for the exigencies of counter-insurgency warfare, a euphemism for the suppression of a people. We are also concerned that Indian soldiers are made to fight an ignoble war against the people of J&K, a war which has begun to cause a great deal of harm to them too.

In remembering the dead we become familiar with them, as well as those they left behind. Through a survey like this we might not get to know them individually. But there is still so much that we can find out about them.

## Occupation, Resistance, Violence

In any conflict situation, there is always an attempt to manipulate the death count. (For instance the U.S. administration rejected researched claims, advanced by the autonomous British medical journal *Lancet*, which shows that the death toll consequent to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 is in excess of 650,000) The JKCCS estimate of the death toll since 1990 is 70,000. This figure has been flatly denied by the Indian State.

However, in an occupation of this nature it is not enough to only count the dead. The living too continue to pay an unacceptable price, their every move controlled by soldiers, their society shattered by spies, intelligence agencies, and government agents. Death then, is only the most brutal metaphor of this occupation; there are other poignant markers of this occupation that seek to smother the aspirations of the living. A military occupation that has evicted people from their farmlands and orchards, foisting interminable humiliations upon a people, and marking their spaces with instruments and agents of violence.

The bunkers, checkpoints and the military camps of an army that seeks not only to perpetuate violence to gain military ends, but also seeks to secure, in the ultimate analysis, political ends through military means. The most obvious marker of this strategy is the half million plus armed forces stationed in the state, who are there surely not only to fight the thousand odd officially estimated militants. If this were the case then the military and paramilitaries of the Indian state would cut a sorry figure on parameters of military efficacy.

This military occupation has been foisted upon the people not only to fight and kill but essentially to establish a hegemony of force and coercion amongst a people perceived as being perpetually rebellious, and thereby to break their collective aspiration and will to freedom.

In its 2006 study [Kashmir: Violence and Health, A quantitative assessment on violence and its impact on the psychosocial and general health status of the Indian Kashmiri population] Medicine Sans Frontiers (MSF) notes in its executive summary:

The period of violence considered was defined by the local population as starting in 1989, continuing until the time of the survey. At the time of interview, almost half (48.1%) of the respondents said they felt only occasionally or never safe. In the period 1989-2005, people frequently reported crackdowns (99.2%), frisking by security forces (85.7%) and round-up raids in villages (82.7%). In the same period, damage to property (39%) or the burning of houses (26.3%) was considerable. Interviewees reported witnessing (73.3%) and directly experiencing themselves (44.1%), physical and psychological mistreatment, such as humiliation and threats.

In addition, people were forced to perform labour (33.7%) or to give shelter to combatants (18.4%). In the same period, one in six respondents (16.9%) were legally or illegally detained. A shocking finding is that torture appears to be widespread among those detained (legally or illegally): 76.7% said they were tortured while they were in captivity. The high levels reported suggest a strategy of intimidation and fear employed by the warring parties.

Ironically, the mental health studies undertaken by the Indian army of its own personnel serving in J&K presents a very grim picture too. A 2003 study [Evolving Medical Strategies for Low Intensity Conflict: A Necessity; Lt Col Ajay Dheer, Lt Col Jaipuria, Col HK Sharma and Brigadier Jasdeep Singh: All India Joint Armed Forces Institute, Volume 59, # 2, 2003] noted:

the “(d)ilemma in being able to resolve the contradictions between general war and Low Intensity Conflict, particularly concepts of ‘enemy’, ‘objectives’ and ‘minimum force’...” is one set of problem. The other is that “whereas in general war nation looks upon the soldier as a savior, out here he is at the receiving end of public hostility. Unable to understand these conflicting relations, the soldier is desensitized”.

Another study from 2005 [Impact of Low Intensity Conflict Operations on Service Personnel; S Chowdhury, PK Chakaraborty, V Pande, TR John, R Saini, SP Rathee, Industrial Psychiatry Journal 2005, 14(1-2)] lends credence to operational experience of the personnel by identifying “operational stressors”. According to them:

“feeling of anger/frustration at fighting with ‘one arm tied behind the back’ (88%)”; “anger at public admonition (84%)”; “bitterness at not being able to deal with the unarmed but vicious

ideologues/motivators/financers of militants, the 'Jamaatis' who were blatantly misusing religious institutions such as 'madrasas' in their anti-national activities (64%)"; "ambiguity with regard to aim (30%)"; feeling of uncertainty (26%); feeling of fighting a futile war with no benefits to the country (25%)", and fear of ever present danger/attack from unexpected quarters (18%)".

It is worth noting that 88% of the respondents felt that they were fighting with 'one arm tied behind their back', 84% resent public criticism, and 64% felt bitter at not being able to "deal with" what are called "Over Ground Workers". In contrast only 30% are troubled by "ambiguity about the aim", 25% believe they are fighting a "futile war" and only 18% fear attack from "unexpected quarters". What this means is that anger and resentment among soldiers outweighs fear and doubt among them. An angry and resentful soldier preys on a population that feels hostile and adversarial. And when they are deployed in such immense numbers, nearly seven hundred thousand for over ten million people, then the likelihood of casualty is inherent.

The Indian army's "Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations" also lays down that

"...the military operations should aim firstly, at neutralizing all hostile elements in the conflict zone that oppose or retard the peace initiatives and secondly, at transforming the will and attitudes of the people....The endeavor should be to bring about a realization that fighting the government is a 'no win' situation and that their anti-government stance will only delay the return of peace and normalcy. Therefore, distancing from the terrorists is in their own interest and the only plausible course of action. However, the manifestation of such a realization can take from a couple of years to decades as attitudes take time to form and to change". (Pp 21-22 emphasis added)

It is important to understand the full import of the above citation. The muscular tone and use of phrases such as "neutralizing", "transforming will and attitudes" and so on, speak for themselves. But when this doctrine is read together with the survey of the psychological profile of government forces, it reveals a direct relationship between the objective of subjugating a people, and the manner in which this warfare brutalizes the occupation power's own personnel in the process of inflicting brutalities on the occupied population. Add to this a dangerous impunity, and it's a recipe for havoc. Casualties in this form of 'dirty war' occur in the form of encounters, custodial killings, enforced disappearances, search and cordon operations, arbitrary detentions, torture etc. We will have more to say when we analyse the data on this issue. But suffice it to say that in this form of warfare there is a high degree of deliberate targeting of non-combatants by the government forces in order to impose their will on the people.

Not all of the 70,000 victims of this dirty war died at the hands of Indian forces. Many were victims of militants. Some of these deaths were either in the nature of internecine killings or deliberate targeting. Some of these were caused by the use of weapons such as grenades and mines which when exploded in crowded areas cause more damage to the non-combatants than the combatants they are aimed against. However, the armed struggle in Kashmir is a direct response to the suppression of peoples' democratic right to self-determination. The Indian Government has consistently and ruthlessly stamped out, discredited, co-opted or destroyed every attempt at non-violent resistance, thereby privileging violence and this has undoubtedly led to excesses perpetrated by militants as well. In other words, while there may be several actors in the violence in J&K, the primary responsibility for the destruction caused rests fair and square on the shoulders of the Indian State.

This is why it is a critical matter to understand who is responsible for prosecuting the war, and why is this war being prosecuted? When deaths occur it is the circumstances which determines and explains why people died and what meaning and significance is or can be attached to it. It will not do to equate victim and the victimizer in a game of sophistry whose purpose is to obfuscate the overarching fact of occupation, and the struggle for people's inalienable right to self-determination.

Under international jurisprudence the term "occupation" denotes hostile military rule against the wishes of the people. This concept derives from the modern principle that people are the sovereigns, whereas occupation signifies its denial. Article 42 of the Hague Regulations (also called law of warfare) describes occupation as a "territory placed under the authority of the hostile army". In the Fourth Geneva

Convention 1949 this is attenuated. Article 2 provides that the convention shall apply even to an occupation that “meets with no armed resistance”. The rationale for this was that there is an inherent hostility between the occupant and the occupied. Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that “the benefits under the Convention shall not be affected by any change introduced, as a result of occupation of territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authority of the occupied territory and the occupying power, nor by annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory”. We are convinced that the conditions in J&K match and conform to everything that is juridically invested in the legal term “occupation”.

The resistance to this occupation became an armed struggle in 1988, and as a result scores of deaths turned into hundreds and then thousands and then tens of thousands. There is a fundamental political, historical, and moral difference between an occupying force and the resistance to it. When the resistance commits crimes we must not flinch from criticizing them for their excesses. But equally we must be mindful of the principal problem - which is the occupation. This obvious point needs to be stressed because pseudo “humanitarian groups” pretend to be neutral between two warring groups, and pretend to be only interested in people’s welfare. However, they remain ignorant about the war, and its context, and gloss over the fact that militants are organically linked to the people, whereas government forces are not. Is it therefore surprising that to this day every namaaz-e-janaza (funeral prayer) of a militant is attended by thousands of people? This does not happen when soldiers or renegades die.

### The Baramulla Survey

The actual survey began in 2003 and continued till 2006. Teams of four or more volunteers would travel to a village and move from house to house, asking people if any member of their family had died or disappeared, either at the hands of the Indian security forces, renegades or the militants. Volunteers then filled the questionnaire prepared by JKCCS. (See Annexure)

Because volunteers did the entire survey, this also meant that the bulk of the work had to be done on weekends or holidays. Data entry, and ensuring the correct entry of data, i.e. ensuring that data fed matched survey forms, took nearly a year. Each data form had to match what had been ‘keyed in’ and cross-checked by a person other than the person who fed the data. However we are aware that some errors could still have crept in a survey of this magnitude. But we believe these are not significant.

### Methodology

This was an exercise in quantitative analysis, with statistical data collected on the basis of a detailed questionnaire. Before commencing the survey a workshop was organised where volunteers were familiarized not just with the questionnaire but also with the broader reasons why the survey was being undertaken and its significance for our own time. People volunteered their time, formed teams, and systematically covered one village after another.

Teams went from house-to-house accompanied either by a village elder or a social activist of the village. The respondents were told clearly that the survey was not meant to get them compensation and that it was not linked to any government project but meant to record those who died, be it a militant, civilian, renegade or police personnel. These forms were then carried to Srinagar, and one member of the team usually supervised the data entry, after which the forms were labeled and stored.

Not all forms came back fully filled. Some had one or more columns unfilled. Those with more than 30% of the columns unfilled were not accepted. (The total numbers of rejections were six)

Since data was collected over a period of three years obviously a village covered in 2003 would naturally not include figures for the subsequent three years. This makes year-wise comparison between various villages difficult, and may also result in a possible under-estimation of the number of deaths. Also, while we did cover most of the villages in Baramulla district four had to be left out as access to these was denied by the Indian Army.

The questionnaire did not have a column for religion. The extent of killings could be more than the survey data throws up also on account that many of those not included in the survey could be from the Kashmiri Pandit community who had migrated in 1990. Since the data was collected from the residents of the district information about those who may have migrated out was not available.

Ideally, the survey would have had to be simultaneous over space and time, clearly impossible without a huge team, and substantial resources.

### Summary of Data for Baramulla district

One of the principal findings of our survey is that of the 5106 people who were killed in Baramulla District between 1990 and 2007, a disproportionately high number of people belonged to the age group 18-55. This is the age group that comprises the principal bread-earners, those who contributed significantly to their household income. Thus it was not just lives lost, but livelihood too that was taken away, leaving whole families in penury.

It's important also to note that these 5106 killings in Baramulla are reported without a single large-scale massacre of the kind encountered in other districts of the Kashmir valley. However, the absence of massacres has not meant that depredation caused by the war was any less.

- Total number of people killed: 5106
- Males 4908: Adults 4557 Children 349 (i.e. those below age 17)
- Females 198: Adults 156 Children 42 (i.e. those below age 17)
- Civilian casualties: 2508
- Militant deaths: 2267
- Custodial murders: 408
- Enforced disappearances: 343

It is notable that of the total of 5106 nearly fifty per cent (2508) were civilians and another forty four percent (2267) were militants. Age group of 18-55 years comprises 4767 deaths. Since adult women comprise about three percent of the deceased, males in the age group 18-55 clearly bore the brunt. If you add the Militant deaths in the age group 18-35 years to those of civilians, more than 70% of all those killed are in this age group, suggesting that the age group 18-35 years, has been particularly targeted. The age profile of government forces personnel and renegades killed too corroborates this. Out of 273 people in this category, 209 belonged to the age group 18-35 years.

Custodial killings at the hands of government forces: survey figures indicate 408. Of these 205 are civilians, 197 militants and former militants, and the remaining six are renegades and others. This reveals the nature of state aggression and how it is managed. More than 50% percent of those killed overall, as well as more than 50% of those killed in custody are civilians: clearly, civilians have been seen as legitimate targets in the war against militancy. This deflates two myths. One, that the army only targets combatants. Two, that Militants have no support from local people. The fact is that the army has consistently conflated civilians and militants, seen them as one and the same thing. Civilians have therefore become 'legitimate' targets.

Enforced disappearances reported for the whole period are 343. Out of this 81 are militants or former militants while five belonged to government forces and 11 were renegades. However an overwhelming 72% (246) are civilians. The Indian government is clearly pursuing Enforced Disappearances as a policy in order to terrorize people. It is of course a tried and tested technique, favoured by other oppressive regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America, most notoriously in Argentina and in Chile under General Pinochet. The phenomenon is clearly not specifically targeted at combatants to qualify as anti militancy or anti insurgency operations. The figures overwhelmingly bear out that this war crime is perpetrated on an entire people.



The Indian government has been claiming that many of those disappeared have crossed the LoC for arms training, but families of the disappeared have consistently been contesting these claims.

### Occupational profile

- Farmers: 1174
- Skilled: 662
- Professional: 532
- Government: 84
- Students: 989

Almost half of those killed in Baramulla District (2452) were moderately or highly economically productive people and 989 were students.

Out of 2508 civilians killed occupational data for 112 was not available. In the case of 2267 militants killed the same data is not available for 143. The survey, however, reveals that the dead belonged to all sections of the society: 55 different occupations were listed for civilians and 36 for militants. Respondents reported those killed as farmers, labourers, artisans, government servants, businessmen, milkmen, blacksmiths, mechanics, engineers etc. What do we make of this? Simply a confirmation of the fact that no section of the society remained aloof and/or unscathed by the war.

On the other hand data available for 2396 civilians and 2124 militants also shows that farmers comprise 626 of the civilians and 548 amongst militants. Among those whose occupation was given as labourers 221 were civilians and 166 militants. 364 civilians and 625 militants were reported to be students. It means that half of those killed (2540) were farmers, labourers and students. 189 civilians killed were businessmen, 205 government employees and 145 were artisans.

Some intriguing patterns were noted: Among the militants 269 were reported to be carpet weavers, a category absent amongst civilians killed. And 56% of all women killed (113) worked in their houses.

### Educational Profile

The survey shows education profile of 4408 persons killed in Baramulla District, with 2695 Literate and 1713 Illiterate.

- Doctorates: 8
- Islamic Studies: 9
- Post Graduate: 35
- Graduate and Under Graduate: 422
- Matriculate: 932
- Under Matriculation: 1289

Amongst the militants, a large number (691) were illiterate. Under matriculation were the next largest group (677) followed by matriculates (477) and those who had completed 10+2 (229). Under graduate, graduate and post graduate were 36, 60 and 22 respectively. And there were two doctorates amongst the militants.

Similarly 1022 civilians were illiterate. Under matriculation numbered 621, matriculates 455, with 10+2 counted at 195. Undergraduate and graduate civilians killed numbered 87. Only 13 were post-graduate while 6 had completed their doctoral studies.

### Income profile (per month)

- Less than Rs 1000: 863
- Between Rs 1001-2000: 1634

- Less than Rs 5000: 503
- Rs 5000 and above: 85

For slain militants, respondents could not provide income profile of 738, while 414 were reported not to be earning members of their respective families. Another 425 reported monthly income of less than Rs.1000; 512 earned between Rs1001-2000 and 163 made between Rs 2001-5000 per month. Out of 2267 militants killed only 15 reported a monthly income above Rs 5001 and more.

What about civilians? In 686 cases respondents failed to provide any information on income and left the column blank while 352 reported no income. Thus 1038 out of 2508 civilians or 40% of the civilians killed had most likely no income. Those earning less than Rs 1000 per month numbered 438 and between Rs 1001 to 2000 were 622. Whereas 340 were shown as earning between Rs 2001-5000 and only 64 between Rs 5001-10,000. Only six deceased civilians earned more than Rs 10,000. So the overwhelming majority of 2098 civilians killed comprise those either with no income or less than Rs 2000 per month.

### Profile of perpetrators

- Government forces: 2821
- Militants: 417
- Unidentified 1768

Out of the total 5106 people killed, the survey identifies perpetrators in case of 3337 deaths. But a large number of cases in the survey (1768) show that the perpetrators remain 'unidentified'. Amongst these 3337 cases, in 2812 instances, Indian forces were found responsible for killings. In contrast, the survey points out that, 417 killings were caused by militants and 108 deaths were ascribed to "cross fire". Significantly, 1952 militants were killed by government forces and 910 civilians also died at their hands.

But what of 1768 deaths caused by "unidentified gunmen"? A breakup of these deaths shows that 304 were militants, 1256 were civilians and 170 were members of government forces or its agencies, and 38 were political activists. Overwhelming majority of these killings (1236) by "unidentified gunmen" was by direct shootings. Three-fourths of them occurred in public view and a quarter inside the houses.

It is not surprising that the targeted killing of civilians started peaking alongside the rise of fratricidal 'Ikhwanis' or renegade phenomenon in 1994. Ikhwanis were collaborative militants bought, armed and protected by the Indian army. They were then let loose on their own people. The phenomenon began getting apparent in 1994 although the diabolical process had started two years earlier.

Not surprisingly the survey registers that the year 1994 witnessed highest number of killings attributed to 'unidentified gunmen'. According to the survey, out of a total of 1768 people killed and ascribed to unidentified gunmen between 1989 and 2006, a bulk of 833 slayings were perpetrated between 1994-2000. This coincides with the emergence of the Ikhwanis phenomenon. The Indian army's patronage to the renegades was aimed at crushing the popular support on the one hand, while giving the Indian state plausible deniability for the crimes against an entire people.

In the prevalent situation the Indian state cannot be absolved of having attempted to eliminate and deter the public support for the fight against occupation through methods which escape and subvert any future legal recourse. In the ultimate analysis, the renegades, although a potent anti-insurgency force, ended up being used as human shields by the Indian army. The killings of civilians correspondingly declined with the systematic liquidation of the renegades by the rebel groups. By 2000, the renegades had also ceased to be a tactical tool for the Indian forces.

It is significant to note that whereas most of the deaths occurred in public places (even if they were by lanes of a village) disappearances and large number of those shot dead by "unidentified gunmen" happened inside houses.

According to the survey, out of 417 persons killed by the militants, 273 were government forces personnel and renegades. Internecine clashes claimed 76 militants, and 68 were either civilians or political activists. But it is interesting to note that out of these 76 inter-group killings, 57 occurred during 1991-1994. These internecine killings began to subside after 1994. Post-1998, the survey records no inter-group fratricide amongst militants.

The survey also reveals that out of total 2267 militants killed in Baramulla District, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) guerilla group lost 1328 cadres, which is more than half of all militants killed. The group also bore the brunt of killings by “unidentified gunmen” in losing 130 out of 304 militants killed.

The year-wise break up of the militants killed highlights that the years between 1991-94 has also been the period of rising killings of militants: 142, 217, 299 and 354 respectively. Civilian killings too reveal a similar trajectory: 173, 247, 240 and 243 in corresponding years. In other words killings were highest during this period.

Out of 1545 encounters in Baramulla District, the same period, 1991-94, also provides evidence of escalation in number of gun battles between militants and government forces: 98, 147, 200 and 244.

The likelihood of government forces, sent to crush a rebellious people, striking at anyone remains high. Given the very workings of counter-insurgency warfare (which is conducted among people), they become targets.

### Government forces

A look at the death toll of government forces and renegades in the survey shows that 273 personnel were killed. Out of these 170 were killed by “unidentified gunmen”. Of these 105 were renegades and 59 police personnel. Assuming that all these 170 killings were carried out by the militants, the scenario throws up two possibilities. In the first place the total number of killings of government forces personnel at 273 is just about 5% of the total death count. And secondly, this death toll reveals that even among the government forces overwhelming majority of those who died were Kashmiris. Thus there is a form of double jeopardy that people experience in such situations. On either side, the victims are primarily local people.

Most significantly, the survey highlights high incidence of killings through gun battles (1510), custodial deaths (408), direct shootings (1236), and cross fire deaths (108). These account for 3262 out of 5106 deaths or little more than 60 percent of all deaths. If enforced disappearances (263) are added to this figure, it reveals how this form of warfare is a “dirty war” in which brutal death is inevitable.

Consequently, out of 5106 people who died between 1990-2006 in Baramulla District, of which 4775 were civilians and militants, in nearly 90% of the cases the culpability of the Indian State is not only primary in that they caused it, but they are also the principal perpetrators of such deaths.

TOTAL KILLED		5106	
MALE		FEMALE	
4908		198	
ADULT	CHILDREN	ADULT	CHILDREN
4559	349	156	42

PERPETRATORS		
<b>TOTAL KILLED</b>		<b>5106</b>
PERPETRATORS KNOWN		3337
UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN		1768
INDIAN ARMED FORCES	MILITANTS	CROSS FIRE
2812	417	108

AFFILIATION OF PEOPLE KILLED BY INDIAN ARMED FORCES	
CIVILIANS	MILITANTS
910	1952

MODES OF KILLING BY INDIAN ARMED FORCES		
ENCOUNTERS	CUSTODIAL	OTHER KILLINGS
1510	408	801

AFFILIATIONS OF PEOPLE KILLED BY UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN			
CIVILIAN	ARMED FORCES & RENEGADES	MILITANTS	POLITICAL ACTIVIST
1256	170	304	38

MODES OF KILLING BY UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN	
BOMB BLAST	36
CROSS FIRING	83
DISAPPEARED	263
ENCOUNTER	19
GRENADE BLAST	35
SHOT DEAD	1236
MINE BLAST	18
MISSING	47
MORTAR SHELLING	31

AGE GENERAL					
0-14	15-17	18-26	27-35	36-55	56 ABOVE
108	283	2338	1293	852	231

AGE MILITANTS					
0-14	15-17	18-26	27-35	36-55	56 ABOVE
11	132	1388	584	142	10
<i>NOTE: OLDEST MILITANT 75 YEARS OLD</i>					

AGE CIVILIANS					
0-14	15-17	18-26	27-35	36-55	56 ABOVE
97	144	855	589	620	203

AGE ARMED FORCES AND RENEGADES					
0-14	15-17	18-26	27-35	36-55	56 ABOVE
0	5	95	114	57	02

AGE POLITICAL ACTIVISTS					
0-14	15-17	18-26	27-35	36-55	56 ABOVE
0	0	3	6	33	16

MILITANTS EDUCATIONAL PROFILE TABLE	
<b>TOTAL MILITANTS KILLED</b>	<b>2267</b>
DATA NOT AVAILABLE	64
ILLITERATE	691
UNDER MATRICULATION	677
MATRICULATION	477
HIGHER SECONDARY	229
UNDER GRADUATE	36
GRADUATE	60
POST GRADUATE	22
PH.D	2
ISLAMIC STUDIES	9

MILITANTS OCCUPATION TABLE	
<b>TOTAL MILITANTS KILLED</b>	<b>2267</b>
DATA NOT AVAILABLE	143
ADVOCATE	1
TOURIST GUIDE	1
ARTISAN	10
BAKER	19
BARBER	12
BUSINESS MAN	73
BUTCHER	2
CARPENTER	59
CARPET WEAVER	269
BUS OR TRUCK CONDUCTORS	6
CONTRACTORS	2
COOK	2
COOLIE	3
FARMERS	548
DRIVERS	20
ELECTRICIAN	3
PRIVATE EMPLOYEE	20
ENGINEER	1
FISHER MAN	10
FOREST WORKER	1
FRUIT BUSINESS	21
GARDENER	1
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE	54
HORSE MAN	5
TEA VENDOR	1
IMAAM (PRIEST)	7
LABOURER	166

TEACHERS	15
MASON	4
MECHANIC	22
MEDICAL ASSISTANTS	3
UNEMPLOYED	8
SHOPKEEPER	48
POLICE	7
POLITICAL ACTIVIST	2
EX-ARMY	2
SHEPHERD	1
STUDENT	625
TAILOR	69

INCOME WISE MILITANT TABLE	
DATA NOT AVAILABLE	738
NO INCOME	414
LESS THAN 1000	425
BETWEEN 1100 TO 2000	512
BETWEEN 2100 TO 5000	163
BETWEEN 5100 TO 10000	10
ABOVE 10000	5

CIVILIAN OCCUPATION TABLE	
<b>TOTAL CIVILIANS KILLED</b>	<b>2508</b>
NIL	12
DATA NOT AVAILABLE	112
ADVOCATE	1
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE	205
WORKERS IN ARMED FORCES	4
ARTISAN	145
BAKER	19
BANK EMPLOYEES	2
BARBER	13
BEGGAR	1
BLACK SMITH	1
BUSINESS MAN	189
BUTCHER	2
CARPENTER	66
CARTMAN	2
PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT	48
COBBLER	1
CONDUCTOR	8
CONTRACTOR	29
COOK	8
COPPER SMITH	1
DOCTOR	1
DOMESTIC WORK	12
DRIVER	55

ELECTRICIAN	2
EMBROIDER	3
ENGINEER	2
EX-ARMY MAN	10
EX-POLICE PERSONNEL	2
FARMER	626
FISHERMAN	11
FRUIT BUSINESS	18
GARDNER	3
HAWKER	5
HOME MAKER	113
HORSE MAN	3
IMAAM	19
LABOURER	221
MASON	7
MECHANIC	24
MILK MAN	2
NUMBERDAR	18
NURSE	2
PAINTER	1
PHOTOGRAPHER	5
REPORTER	2
RET. GOVT EMPLOYEE	3
SARPANCH	5
SHEPHERD	6
SINGER	1
STONE CARVER	1
STUDENT	364
TAILOR	47
TEACHER	39
WARD MEMBER	2
WATCH MAKER	2
WATCH MAN	2

INCOME WISE CIVILIAN TABLE	
DATA NOT AVAILABLE	686
LESS THAN 1000	438
BETWEEN 1100 TO 2000	622
BETWEEN 2100 TO 5000	340
BETWEEN 5100 TO 10000	64
ABOVE 10000	6
NIL	352

ARMED FORCES & RENEGADES KILLED BY UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN	
TOTAL ARMED FORCES & RENEGADES KILLED BY UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN	<b>170</b>
ARMY	1

ARMY INFORMER	4
BORDER SECURITY FORCE	1
POLICE	59
RENEGADES	105

MILITANTS KILLED BY UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN	
<b>TOTAL MILITANTS KILLED BY UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN</b>	<b>304</b>
AL BARQ	14
AL FATEH FORCE	2
AL JEHAD	41
AL MUSTAFA LIBERATION FIGHTERS	1
AL UMAR MUJAHIDEEN	1
FREEDOM FRONT	1
HARKAT-UL-ANSAR	1
HARKAT-UL-MUJAHIDEEN	3
HIZBUL MOMINEEN	1
HIZBUL MUJAHIDEEN	130
IKHWAN-UL-MUSLIMEEN	1
JAMMU KASHMIR LIBERATION FRONT	39
JEHAD FORCE	6
LASHKAR-E-TOIBA	3
OTHER MILITANTS	42
MUSLIM JANBAZ FORCE	8
MUSLIM MUJAHIDEEN	2
OPERATION BALAKOTE	2
PASBAN-E-ISLAM	2
STUDENTS LIBERATION FRONT	2
TEHREEK-JEHAD-E-ISLAMI	2

POLITICAL ACTIVIST KILLED BY UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN	
<b>TOTAL POLITICAL ACTIVISTS KILLED BY UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN</b>	<b>38</b>
AWAMI LEAGUE	4
CONGRESS	7
JAMAT-E-ISLAMI	2
NATIONAL CONFERENCE	11
PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY	1
PEOPLE'S LEAGUE	1
POLITICAL ACTIVIST	12

CIVILIAN EDUCATIONAL PROFILE TABLE	
<b>TOTAL CIVILIANS KILLED</b>	<b>2508</b>
DATA NOT AVAILABLE	97
ILLITERATE	1022
UNDER MATRICULATION	621
MATRICULATION	455
10+2	195
UNDER GRADUATE	29
GRADUATE	58
POST GRADUATE	13
PHD	6
ISLAMIC STUDIES	6



LLB	2
BUMS	2
MBBS	1
B.E.	1

ORGANISATIONAL AFFILIATION OF MILITANTS KILLED	
<b>TOTAL MILITANTS KILLED</b>	<b>2267</b>
AL BADR	7
AL BARQ	67
AL FATEH FORCE	22
AL JEHAD	185
AL MUSTAFA LIBERATION FIGHTERS	1
AL UMAR MUJAHIDEEN	14
ALLAH TIGERS	1
AL MADAD YALGAR-E-ALI	2
FREEDOM FRONT	1
HARKAT-UL-ANSAR	26
HARKAT-UL-JEHAD-ISLAMI	2
HARKATUL MUJAHIDEEN	9
HIZBUL MOMINEEN	9
HIZBUL MUJAHIDEEN	1328
HIZBULLAH	10
IKHWAN UL MUSLIMEEN	4
ISLAMI JUNG	1
JAISH-E-MOHAMMAD	15
JAMIATUL MUJAHIDEEN	5
JAMMU KASHMIR LIBERATION FRONT	180
JEHAD FORCE	44
K2 CODE	1
LASHKAR-E-TOIBA	26
LASHKAR-E-AYOUBI	2
LIBERATION ARMY	1
MUSLIM JANBAZ FORCE	16
MUSLIM MUJAHIDEEN	14
OPERATION BALAKOTE	4
OTHER MILITANTS	246
PASBAN-E-ISLAM	3
STUDENT'S LIBERATION FRONT	11
TEHREEK-JEHAD-E-ISLAMI	4
TEHREEK-UL-MUJAHIDEEN	6

YEAR WISE DATA OF MILITANTS KILLED	
<b>TOTAL MILITANTS KILLED</b>	<b>2267</b>
YEAR NOT KNOWN	60
1989	8
1990	84
1991	142
1992	217
1993	299
1994	354
1995	210

1996	171
1997	124
1998	103
1999	86
2000	86
2001	113
2002	80
2003	55
2004	36
2005	28
2006	11

YEAR WISE DATA OF ARMED FORCES AND RENEGADES KILLED	
<b>TOTAL ARMED FORCES AND RENEGADES KILLED</b>	<b>273</b>
YEAR NOT KNOWN	6
1989	NIL
1990	3
1991	1
1992	10
1993	10
1994	8
1995	17
1996	29
1997	16
1998	24
1999	22
2000	28
2001	23
2002	20
2003	19
2004	14
2005	16
2006	7

YEAR WISE DATA OF CIVILIANS KILLED	
<b>TOTAL CIVILIANS KILLED</b>	<b>2508</b>
YEAR NOT KNOWN	54
1988	2
1989	18
1990	144
1991	173
1992	247
1993	240
1994	243
1995	181
1996	155
1997	122
1998	143
1999	154
2000	132
2001	140
2002	108
2003	95
2004	55
2005	56

2006	46
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YEAR WISE DATA OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS KILLED	
<b>TOTAL POLITICAL ACTIVISTS KILLED</b>	<b>58</b>
YEAR NOT KNOWN	1
1989	NIL
1990	2
1991	5
1992	1
1993	1
1994	2
1995	8
1996	2
1997	1
1998	7
1999	4
2000	2
2001	6
2002	4
2003	3
2004	4
2005	4
2006	1

DATA OF PEOPLE KILLED IN BOMB BLASTS			
<b>TOTAL PEOPLE KILLED IN BOMB BLASTS</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>FEMALES</b>	<b>5</b>
CIVILIANS	40		
HIZBUL MUJAHIDEEN	1		
JEHAD FORCE	1		

YEAR WISE DATA OF PEOPLE KILLED IN BOMB BLASTS			
1990	3	CIVILIANS	3
1991	2	CIVILIANS	2
1992	3	CIVILIANS	3
1993	4	CIVILIANS	3
1994	0	CIVILIANS	0
1995	3	CIVILIANS	3
1996	3	CIVILIANS	3
1997	0	CIVILIANS	0
1998	0	CIVILIANS	0
1999	1	CIVILIANS	1
2000	6	CIVILIANS	6
2001	6	CIVILIANS	5
2002	3	CIVILIANS	3
2003	5	CIVILIANS	5
2004	2	CIVILIANS	2
2005	0	CIVILIANS	0
2006	1	CIVILIANS	1

DATA OF PEOPLE KILLED IN GRENADE BLASTS			
<b>TOTAL PEOPLE KILLED IN GRENADE BLAST</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>FEMALES</b>	<b>6</b>

CIVILIANS	37		
AL BARQ	1		
HIZBUL MUJAHIDEEN	2		
JAMMU KASHMIR LIBERATION FRONT	1		
POLICE	3		

YEAR WISE DATA OF PEOPLE KILLED IN GRENADE BLASTS			
1990	1	CIVILIANS	0
1991	1	CIVILIANS	0
1992	1	CIVILIANS	0
1993	6	CIVILIANS	4
1994	3	CIVILIANS	2
1995	3	CIVILIANS	3
1996	3	CIVILIANS	3
1997	2	CIVILIANS	2
1998	10	CIVILIANS	10
1999	1	CIVILIANS	1
2000	2	CIVILIANS	2
2001	4	CIVILIANS	4
2002	0	CIVILIANS	0
2003	1	CIVILIANS	1
2004	0	CIVILIANS	0
2005	1	CIVILIANS	1
2006	5	CIVILIANS	4

DATA OF PEOPLE KILLED IN CROSS FIRINGS			
<b>TOTAL PEOPLE KILLED IN CROSS FIRING (ONLY CIVILIANS)</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>FEMALES</b>	<b>23</b>

YEAR WISE DATA OF PEOPLE KILLED IN CROSS FIRINGS	
YEAR NOT KNOWN	1
1989	2
1990	16
1991	26
1992	20
1993	23
1994	20
1995	12
1996	11
1997	3
1998	7
1999	13
2000	6
2001	8
2002	8
2003	8
2004	1
2005	4
2006	3

DATA OF CUSTODIAL KILLING VICTIMS	
TOTAL PEOPLE KILLED IN CUSTODY	<b>409</b>
CIVILIANS	205
RELEASED MILITANTS	7
MILITANTS	183
POLITICAL ACTIVISTS (7 FROM JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI)	8
ARMED FORCES & RENEGADES	6

ORGANISATIONAL AFFILIATION OF MILITANTS KILLED IN CUSTODY	
<b>TOTAL MILITANTS KILLED IN CUSTODY</b>	<b>183</b>
AL BARQ	3
AL FATEH FORCE	3
AL JEHAD	13
AL UMAR MUJAHIDEEN	2
HARKAT UL ANSAR	1
HARKAT UL MUJAHIDEEN	1
HIZBUL MUJAHIDEEN	120
HIZBULLAH	3
IKHWAN UL MUSLIMEEN	1
JAISH-E-MOHAMMAD	2
JAMIAT UL MUJAHIDEEN	1
JAMMU KASHMIR LIBERATION FRONT	13
JEHAD FORCE	7
LASHKAR-E-TOIBA	2
MUSLIM JANBAZ FORCE	2
MUSLIM MUJAHIDEEN	2
OTHER MILITANTS	5
STUDENT'S LIBERATION FRONT	1
TEHREEK UL MUJAHIDEEN	1

MARITAL STATUS OF CUSTODIAL KILLING VICTIMS	
MARRIED	195
UNMARRIED	211
N.A.	2
DIVORCED	1

AGE WISE CUSTODIAL KILLING DATA (VICTIM'S AGE GROUP RANGES FROM 12 TO 90)	
BETWEEN 12 TO 14 YEARS	5
BETWEEN 15 TO 26 YEARS	198
BETWEEN 27 TO 35 YEARS	114
BETWEEN 35 TO 55 YEARS	76
BETWEEN 56 TO 90 YEARS	15

OCCUPATION OF CIVILIAN CUSTODIAL KILLING VICTIMS	
STUDENT	31
BUSINESS MAN	16
CARPENTERS	7
CARPET WEAVERS	16
FARMERS	43
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES	16

LABOURERS	20
SHOP KEEPERS	5
TEACHERS	4
TAILORS	7
SHEPHERDS	2
RETIRED SOLDIER	1
PRIVATE EMPLOYEES	4
PEASANT	1
NUMBERDARS	3
PHARMACIST	1
MECHANICS	6
IMAAMS	3
DRIVERS	4
COOK	1
CONTRACTOR	1
CLERK	1
BAKERS	2
BARBER	1
NOT KNOWN	9

PERPETRATORS OF CUSTODIAL KILLINGS	
ARMY	283
BORDER SECURITY FORCE	84
SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP	13
OTHER SECURITY FORCES	7
RENEGADES	23
CENTRAL RESERVE POLICE FORCE	7
INDIAN TIBETIAN BORDER POLICE - INSIDE KOT BALWAL JAIL	3
DELHI POLICE	1
POLICE (P.S. PATTAN)	1

OTHER DETAILS OF CUSTODIAL KILLINGS CASES	
CASES FILED IN COURTS AGAINST CUSTODIAL KILLINGS	12

YEAR WISE DATA OF CUSTODIAL KILLINGS			
YEAR NOT KNOWN	6	CIVILIANS	2
1990	20	CIVILIANS	18
1991	25	CIVILIANS	15
1992	40	CIVILIANS	19
1993	41	CIVILIANS	19
1994	58	CIVILIANS	21
1995	56	CIVILIANS	25
1996	32	CIVILIANS	13
1997	30	CIVILIANS	20
1998	21	CIVILIANS	7
1999	14	CIVILIANS	12
2000	20	CIVILIANS	9
2001	14	CIVILIANS	11
2002	14	CIVILIANS	7
2003	3	CIVILIANS	2
2004	8	CIVILIANS	2

2005	3	CIVILIANS	1
2006	4	CIVILIANS	2

DATA OF ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE VICTIMS			
TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE SUBJECTED TO ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE		337	
CIVILIANS	251	FEMALES	5
ARMED FORCES & RENEGADES	16		
MILITANTS	70		

ORGANISATIONAL AFFILIATION OF THE MILITANTS SUBJECTED TO ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE	
<b>TOTAL NUMBER OF MILITANTS</b>	<b>70</b>
AL BARQ	3
AL JEHAD	12
AL UMAR MUJAHIDEEN	1
HIZBUL MOMINEEN	1
HIZBUL MUJAHIDEEN	34
JAMMU KASHMIR LIBERATION FRONT	6
JEHAD FORCE	2
LASHKAR-E-TOIBA	1
MUSLIM JANBAZ FORCE	4
OTHER MILITANTS	6

OCCUPATION OF CIVILIAN ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE VICTIMS	
<b>TOTAL NUMBER OF CIVILIANS DISAPPEARED</b>	<b>251</b>
ARTISAN	1
BARBER	2
BUSINESS	5
CARPENTERS	9
CARPET WEAVERS	28
CONDUCTORS	2
CONTRACTOR	1
COPPER SMITH	1
DRIVERS	9
EMBROIDERS	2
FARMERS	50
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES	15
HANDICRAFTS	3
IMAAMS	2
LABOURERS	20
SHOP KEEPERS	9
STUDENTS	47 (1 PHD STUDENT)
TAILORS	7
TEACHERS	7
INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE	31

PERPETRATOR AGENCIES OF ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE	
ARMY	39
BORDER SECURITY FORCE	11
CENTRAL RESERVE POLICE FORCE	6
MILITANTS	16
NOT KNOWN	130
POLICE	1
RENEGADES	5
UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN	129

OTHER DETAILS ON ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES	
CASES FILED IN COURTS AGAINST ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE	21
CASES OF CIVILIANS	18
CASES OF MILITANTS	2
CASE OF POLICE PERSONNEL	1

YEAR WISE ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE CASES			
YEAR NOT KNOWN	13	CIVILIANS	8
1989	4	CIVILIANS	4
1990	34	CIVILIANS	26
1991	32	CIVILIANS	28
1992	41	CIVILIANS	31
1993	34	CIVILIANS	20
1994	28	CIVILIANS	22
1995	28	CIVILIANS	19
1996	19	CIVILIANS	16
1997	14	CIVILIANS	12
1998	15	CIVILIANS	6
1999	17	CIVILIANS	12
2000	10	CIVILIANS	7
2001	21	CIVILIANS	17
2002	8	CIVILIANS	8
2003	9	CIVILIANS	6
2004	3	CIVILIANS	2
2005	4	CIVILIANS	4
2006	3	CIVILIANS	3

MARITAL STATUS OF ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE VICTIMS	
MARRIED	139
UNMARRIED	198

DATA ON HALF WIDOWS AND HALF ORPHANS	
<b>TOTAL NUMBER OF HALF WIDOWS</b>	<b>139</b>
<b>TOTAL NUMBER OF HALF ORPHANS</b>	<b>388</b>
FATHER'S AGE UNDER 30	134
FATHER'S AGE BETWEEN 31 TO 40	136
FATHER'S AGE BETWEEN 41 TO 50	62
FATHERS'S AGE BETWEEN 51 TO 60	56



DATA ON PEOPLE KILLED IN ENCOUNTERS	
<b>TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED IN ENCOUNTERS</b>	<b>1545</b>
ORGANISATIONAL AFFILIATIONS OF PEOPLE KILLED IN ENCOUNTERS	
AL BADR	7
AL BARQ	36
AL FATEH FORCE	17
AL JEHAD	103
AL UMAR MUJAHIDEEN	9
ALLAH TIGERS	1
AL MADAD YALGAR-E-ALI	2
ARMY	2
BORDER SECURITY FORCE	3
HARKAT-UL-ANSAR	22
HARKAT-UL-JEHAD-ISLAMI	2
HARKAT-UL-MUJAHIDEEN	5
HIZBUL MOMINEEN	5
HIZBUL MUJAHIDEEN	958
HIZBULLAH	6
IKHWAN-UL-MUSLIMEEN	1
ISLAMI JUNG	1
JAISH-E-MOHAMMAD	12
JAMIATUL MUJAHIDEEN	3
JAMMU KASHMIR LIBERATION FRONT	87
JEHAD FORCE	30
K2 CODE	1
LASHKAR-E-TOIBA	21
LASHKAR-E-AYOUBI	1
LIBERATION ARMY	1
MUSLIM JANBAZ FORCE	4
MUSLIM MUJAHIDEEN	8
OPERATION BALAKOTE	1
OTHER MILITANTS	162
PASBAN-E-ISLAM	1
POLICE	16
RENEGADES	7
STUDENT'S LIBERATION FRONT	5
TEHREEK JEHAD-E-ISLAMI	2
TEHREEK-UL-MUJAHIDEEN	3

YEAR WISE DATA OF PEOPLE KILLED IN ENCOUNTERS	
YEAR NOT KNOWN	28
1989	4
1990	56
1991	98
1992	147
1993	200
1994	244
1995	126
1996	104
1997	84

1998	65
1999	62
2000	60
2001	88
2002	63
2003	48
2004	30
2005	29
2006	9

DATA OF PEOPLE KILLED IN GROUP CLASHES		
TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED IN GROUP CLASHES	76	
	FEMALE	1

AFFILIATIONS OF PEOPLE KILLED IN GROUP CLASH	
AL BARQ	9
AL JEHAD	11
CIVILIANS	16
HARKAT-UL-ANSAR	1
HIZBUL MUJAHIDEEN	14
IKHWAN-UL-MUSLIMEEN	1
JAMIATUL MUJAHIDEEN	1
JAMMU KASHMIR LIBERATION FRONT	17
JEHAD FORCE	1
LASHKAR-E-AYOUBI	1
OTHER MILITANTS	4

YEAR WISE DATA OF PEOPLE KILLED IN GROUP CLASHES			
TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED IN GROUP CLASHES		76	
YEAR NOT KNOWN	4	CIVILIANS	1
1989	0	CIVILIANS	0
1990	0	CIVILIANS	0
1991	12	CIVILIANS	5
1992	10	CIVILIANS	4
1993	20	CIVILIANS	2
1994	15	CIVILIANS	2
1995	6	CIVILIANS	1
1996	7	CIVILIANS	0
1997	1	CIVILIANS	1
1998	1	CIVILIANS	0
1999	0	CIVILIANS	0
2000	0	CIVILIANS	0
2001	0	CIVILIANS	0
2002	0	CIVILIANS	0
2003	0	CIVILIANS	0
2004	0	CIVILIANS	0
2005	0	CIVILIANS	0
2006	0	CIVILIANS	0

PERPETRATORS OF PEOPLE KILLED IN GROUP CLASHES	
AL BARQ	2
HIZBUL MUJAHIDEEN	24

MUSLIM MUJAHIDEEN	1
JAMMU KASHMIR LIBERATION FRONT	2
OTHER MILITANTS	49

DATA OF PEOPLE KILLED IN MINE BLASTS	
<b>TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED IN MINE BLASTS</b>	<b>30</b>
FEMALES	5

AFFILIATIONS OF PEOPLE KILLED IN MINE BLASTS	
CIVILIANS	19
HIZBUL MUJAHIDEEN	2
POLICE	3
POLITICAL ACTIVIST	1
RENEGADES	5

PERPETRATORS OF MINE BLAST KILLINGS	
ARMY	5
BORDER SECURITY FORCE	1
MILITANTS	6
NOT KNOWN	14
UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN	4

YEAR WISE DATA OF MINE BLAST KILLINGS			
1990	2	CIVILIANS	2
1991	0	CIVILIANS	0
1992	1	CIVILIANS	1
1993	1	CIVILIANS	1
1994	2	CIVILIANS	0
1995	0	CIVILIANS	0
1996	1	CIVILIANS	1
1997	5	CIVILIANS	2
1998	2	CIVILIANS	1
1999	0	CIVILIANS	0
2000	5	CIVILIANS	4
2001	1	CIVILIANS	1
2002	2	CIVILIANS	0
2003	1	CIVILIANS	0
2004	3	CIVILIANS	2
2005	2	CIVILIANS	2
2006	2	CIVILIANS	2

DATA ON KILLINGS DUE TO MISFIRE		
TOTAL KILLINGS DUE TO MISFIRE	4	
	FEMALE	1

AFFILIATIONS OF PEOPLE KILLED DUE TO MISFIRE	
CIVILIANS	4

PERPETRATORS OF KILLING DUE TO MISFIRE
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MILITANTS	4
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MISSING WHILE CROSSING THE BORDER	53
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DATA OF PEOPLE KILLED DUE TO MORTAR SHELLING	
<b>TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED DUE TO MORTAR SHELLING (ALL CIVILIANS)</b>	<b>48</b>
FEMALES	17

YEAR WISE DATA OF PEOPLE KILLED IN MORTAR SHELLING	
1990	1
1991	2
1992	0
1993	1
1994	1
1995	1
1996	2
1997	2
1998	14
1999	5
2000	5
2001	3
2002	6
2003	4
2004	1
2005	0
2006	0

**Appendix I**

***Jammu & Kashmir***  
**Coalition of Civil Society**

The Bund Amira Kadal, Srinagar - 190001, Jammu and Kashmir

Form Serial Number: - \_\_\_\_\_ (To be filled in by the Block Leader)

A	Name of the dead person/or disappeared	
	Father's Name	
	Mother's Name	
	Address	

B	Age	
	Educational Qualification	
	Occupation	
	Income	
	Affiliation	

C	Marital Status	
	Spouses Name	
	Spouses Age	
	No. of Children	
	Name, Age & Sex of Children	1. 2. 3. 4.

D.	No. of Dependents	
	Any earning member or source of income	
	Total income	
	Children	
	Children's Education & Age	

E.	Date & time of Death or Disappearance of the person	
	Location of Death or Disappearance	
	Person seen last: Date & time	
	Circumstances of death (a) If death in	

	Custody then details. (b) In other cases of death short narrative with names of the people responsible.	
	Witnesses: (Name & Addresses)	
	Newspaper record	
	Government Records	
	Perpetrators: Name of the agency	

F.	FIR filed:	
	If yes, FIR no.	
	Police Station: (Police officer who registered the FIR)	
	Habeas Corpus Petition filed: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ If yes then, No, Date</li> <li>➤ Court where filed</li> <li>➤ Name of the lawyer</li> <li>➤ Investigation: Status and Finding</li> </ul>	
	Applied for Relief & Rehabilitation: (Short detail) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ If under SRO 43</li> <li>➤ If under Ex-Gratia relief</li> <li>➤ If due to recommendations of SHRC</li> <li>➤ Any other</li> </ul>	
	Any Appeals filed with government:	

G.	Any other observations which otherwise are not mentioned in the questionnaire:	
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Date of filling the form: - \_\_\_\_\_

Name of the field Address  
researchers

Signature

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